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EDWARD GONZALES, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation- Proceedings- Witnesses-Crossexamination.-Denial of a claimant's right to cross-examine
the Industrial Accident Commission's rating expert in a workmen's compensation proceeding is a denial of due process, but
where the commission granted the claimant's application for
reconsideration of its decision and he was afforded a hearing
to cross-examine the rating expert, following which the commission reaffirmed its previous decision, the claimant was not
denied due process.
[2] !d.-Proceedings-Continuing Jurisdiction Over Orders and
Awards.-Where the Subsequent Injuries Fund filed its petition for reconsideration of a decision of the Industrial Accident
Commission within 20 days after the referee's amended findings and within five years from the date of injury, and such
petition, which was granted, was filed pursuant to Lab. Code,
§ 5900, a final order of the commission, which related solely
to proceedings for reconsideration under chapter 7 of part 4
of division 4 of the Labor Code, was within the jurisdiction
of the commission, though more than five years had elapsed
after the injury occurred, since there was no provision in
chapter 7 limiting the time within which the commission could
make its decision on reconsideration.
[3] Id.-Certiorari-Review.-]'indings of the Industrial Accident
Commission are not subject to review on the ground that
there is no substantial evidence to sustain them except insofar
as it may appear that they have been made without any
evidence whatever in their support.
[4] !d.-Permanent Disability-Effect of Prior Disability.-It is
error to rate a congenital condition of deaf-mutism to which
a claimant for workmen's compensation has so far adjusted

[1] See Cal.Jur., 'Vorkmen's Compensation, § 147; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 458.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 160; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 519.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 213 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 522 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 153;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 205; [3] \Vorkmen's Compensation, § 267; [ 4] Workmen's Compensation, § 221; [5] Workmen's
Compensation, § 222.
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himself us to be reasonably employable after the
as well
as before
the smne standard that it would have been rated
if he had lost his hearing and speeeh in the same aeeident in
which he received the industrial injury.

[5] !d.-Benefits Recoverable--Determination of Percentage of
Disability.-·-\Vhere the evidence in a workmen's compensation
case disdosed that the daimant had been a deaf-mnte from
the age of 5 and was unable to read lips, that he had learned
the painting trade when he Wtls 14, that he had been a prize
fighter and an aircraft worker during the war, that he had
joined the painters' union and had worked steadily from that
time until the accident in question, the commission properly
reasoned that claimant had lived with his condition all his
life and that there was no showing that the industrially-caused
injury would force him to change his occupation, in which case
his congenital deaf-mutism might be a greater handicap, and
that since the lower rating, added to the percentage of total
disability resulting from the industrial accident, did not equal
the 70 per cent required by Lab. Code, § 4751, he was not
entitled to additional benefits from the Subsequent Injuries
J<'und.

PROCEEDING to review a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission denying compensation from the Subsequent
Injuries Fund. Award affirmed.
Levy, Russell & DeRoy and Jack P. Koszdin for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss,
Assistant Attorney General, F. G. Girard and Henry K.
Workman, Deputy Attorneys General, Everett A. Corten,
Edward ~'\.. Sarkisian, Hobert J. Calvert and Daniel C. Murphy for Respondents.
McCOMB, J.-Petitioner seeks annulment of a decision
made by respondent Industrial Accident Commission denying
him compensation from the Subsequent Injuries Fund of the
State of California.
Facts : Petitioner is 42 years of age. He has been a deafmute since he was 5 years old, and he is unable to read lips.
He worked as a painter for a number of years prior to
October 18, 1951, when he sustained an industrial injury
to his back.
On December 3, 1952, the commission awarded him benefits
for a 21 :liz per cent permanent partial disability for the injury.
Contemporaneously, pursuant to section 4751 of the Labor
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and award was made
was
on the
in a combined disability rating
and an award was made against the Subsequent
Fund of $7,020 plus a lifetime pension.
On March 13, 1956, the Subsequent Injuries Fund's petition to reopen the cause was granted.
On
6, 1956, after a hearing, a referee made an
order and award amending the previous finding of December 3, 1952, by increasing the rating for petitioner's combined
from 80 per cent to 88 per cent.
On August 24, 1956, the Subsequent Injuries Fund filed its
petition for reconsideration, which was granted, and the commission rerated petitioner's disability for deaf-mutism on the
basis of 50 per cent of the standard rating for loss of speech
and loss of hearing industrially caused. This resulted in a
combined rating of 55% per cent, following which an order
of the commission was filed October 10, 1956, directing that
petitioner take nothing from the Subsequent Injuries Fund.
Thereafter, pursuant to petitioner's application, a further
hearing was held to permit petitioner to cross-examine the
rating expert, who testified, in substance, that he was instructed to issue a rating of 50 per cent of the standard
schedule rating for loss of speech and for loss of hearing; that
he did not take into consideration petitioner's inability to read
lips; and that there -vvas no rating for deaf-mutism as such
in the rating schedule, but only ratings for loss of hearing
and loss of speech separately.
On January 23, 1957, the commission affirmed its decision
of October 10, 1956, that petitioner take nothing from the
Subsequent Injuries Fund.
[1] Petitioner contends:
First. That the commission's decision of October 10, 1956,
was rnade without affording hirn the right to cross-exarnine
the mting expert and that he was th1ts denied his constitutional right of due process.
'l'his contention is devoid of merit under the facts in the
present case. On October 3, 1956, after granting the petition
of the Subsequent Injuries Fund for reconsideration, the
commission requested from the rating bureau a recommended
permanent disability rating on the basis of 50 per cent of
the standard rating for loss of speech and loss of hearing.
On October 8, 1956, the commission gave notice that the
report had been received from the rating bureau and that
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the case would be submitted for decision seven days thereafter
unless good cause was shown to the contrary. However, two
days later, on October 10, 1956, the commission made its
decision, after reconsideration, rerating petitioner's combined
disability at less than 70 per cent.
Section 5704 of the Labor Code provides: ''. . .
of
all reports and other matters added to the
otherwise
than during the course of an open hearing, shall be served
upon the parties to the proceeding, and an opportunity shall
be given to produce evidence in explanation or rebuttal
thereof before decision is rendered." Commission Rule No.
10929 provides: "After the Permanent Disability Rating
Bureau has prepared the recommended rating and the rating
specialist has signed it, it shall be returned to the person
requesting the recommended rating, who shall thereupon cause
it to be served on all interested parties, together with a notice
that the case will be submitted for decision seven days after
the date of service, unless good cause to the contrary is shown
in writing prior thereto.''
In making its decision on October 10, 1956, the commission
did not accord petitioner the required seven days within which
to object to the recommended rating or to request a hearing
for the purpose of cross-examining the rating expert. It is
settled that the denial of such a right of cross-examination is
a denial of due process. (Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 47 Cal.App.2d 713, 715 [118 P.2d 848];
Walker Min. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 35 Cal.App.2d 257,
262 [95 P.2d 188] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)
However, in the present case the commission granted petitioner's application for reconsideration, and he was afforded
a hearing to cross-examine the rating expert, following which
the commission reaffirmed its order of October 10, 1956. Thus,
petitioner, having been afforded an opportunity of crossexamination at the subsequent hearing, was not denied due
process in the instant case. (Walsh v. Industrial Ace. Corn.,
1 Cal.2d 747, 748 [I] [36 P.2d 1072].)
[2] Second. That the cornrnission was without jurisdiction to rnake the order of January 23, 1957, since more than
five years had elapsed after the injury occurred.
This contention is likewise devoid of merit. Section 5804
of the Labor Code provides that no award of compensation
shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after five years from
the date of the injury. In the instant case, the injury
occurred on October 18, 1951. The Subsequent Injuries Fund
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filed its petition to reopen on March 13, 1956, and on August
6, 1956, an order was made by the referee amending the finding and award, all within five years from the date of the
injury.
Section 5900 of the Labor Code provides, in substance,
that any person aggrieved by a final order, decision, or award
made and filed by a commissioner or referee may petition the
commission for reconsideration in respect to any matters
determined or covered thereby.
Section 5903 of the I1ahor Code provides that a petition for
reconsideration may he filed at any time within 20 days
after the service of any final order, decision, or award upon
any of the grounds therein specified.
Sections 5900 and 5903 are parts of chapter 7, entitled "Reconsideration and Judicial Review," of part 4 of division 4.
In the present case, respondent Subsequent Injuries Fund
filed its petition for reconsideration within 20 days after the
referee's amended findings and within five years from the
date of injury. 'l'his petition for reconsideration was filed
pursuant to the provisions of section 5900, and the final order
of the commission made on ,January 23, 1957, which was more
than five years from the date of the injury, related solely
to the proceedings for reconsideration under chapter 7.
Stdton v. Industrial Ace. Com., 46 Cal.2d 791 [298 P.2d
857], relied on by petitioner, is not here in point. That case
expressly points out, at page 795, that sections 5803 and 5804
of the Labor Code applied to the proceedings there under
consideration and that the five-year limitation within which
the commission may amend or rescind an award is fixed by
section 5804 of the Labor Code. There is no provision in
chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for reconsideration and
judicial review, limiting the time within which the commission
may make its decision on reconsideration, and in the absence
of a statutory limitation none will be implied.
Third. 'l'hat the decision of the comrnission in rating his
deaf-mutism at 50 per cent of the standard rating is not snstaincd by the evidence ancl is unreasonable and arbitrary.
This contention is untenable.
[3] (1) Findings of the Industrial Accident Commission
are not subject to review on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain th0m, except insofar as it may
appear that they have been made without any evidence whatever in their support. (Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Indttstrial
Ace. Com., 47 Cal.2d 903, 905 l2] [306 P.2d 425].)

May 1958]

GoNZALES

v.

INDUSTRIAL

Ace.

CoM.

365

[50 C.2d 360; 325 P.2d 993]

[4]
It is error to rate a congenital condition of deafmutism to which petitioner haB so far adjusted himself as to
be reasonably employalJle after the injury as well as before
by the same standard that it would have been rated if petitioner had lost hiB hearing and speech in the same accident
iu which he reeeived the .industrial injury. (State v. Industrial Ace. Com., 12fJ Cal.App.2d 802, 304 jl] l276 P.2d
820 J jheariug deuied by the Snpn·me Court].) Petitioner's
disability would have been mueh greater if he had had the
normal faculties of speeeh and hearing up to the time of the
aeeident and had lost them then, \Yith the whole period of
adjustment to their loss before him, than it could possibly
have been with the whole period of adjustment to their lack
lw himl him.
[5] In the instant case, the record discloses that petitioner
had been a deaf-mute from the age of 5 years and was unable
to read lips; that he had learned the painting trade when
he was 14; that he had been a prize fighter and an aircraft
worker during the war; and that in 1944 he joined the
painters' union and had worked steadily from that time until
the accident. It further discloses that since his recovery he
has worked as steadily as any other member of the painters'
union.
Therefore, the commission properly reasoned that petitioner
had lived with his condition all of his life and that there was
no showing that the industrially-caused injury would force
him to change his occupation, in which case his congenital
deaf-mutism might be a greater handicap. 1 The commission
thus concluded that since the lowered rating, added to the
percentage of total disability resulting from the industrial
accident, did not equal the 70 per cent required by section
4751 of the Labor Code, 2 petitioner was not entitled to
additional benefits from the Subsequent Injuries Fund.
1
For an excellent discussion of the concept of pennanent disability
under the California plan and the reasoning in support of the variable
factors taken into account thereunder, see ''Variable Factors in Pennanent Disability Rating, With Particular Reference to the Inclusion of
Age and Occupation,'' by R. E. Haggard, Supervisor, Permanent Disability Rating Bureau, vol. 2, Appendix to Journal of the Senate, California Regular Session, 1931, page 101 of Partial Report of Senate
Interim Committee to the Senate on ·workmen's Compensation Benefits.
2
Section 4 731 of the Labor Code reads as follows: "If an employee
who is permanently partially disabled receives a subsequent compensable
injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability so that the
degree of disability caused by the combination of both disabilities is
greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury
alone, and the combined effect of the last injury and the previous dis-
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of the
binding upon this
court.
In Stale v. Industrial Lice. Com., supra, :1 case almo><t identical in its facts with the present case, au order of the Industrial Aeeidf'nt Cornmission
recovery against
the
Fund was annulled when the comevidence on the question, had applied
deaf-mutism to a ease indeaf-mutism. The court in such case
the corrcc:t
as that set forth under rule
, supra. In the present case, the eommis;;;ion, in following
this rule, concluded that deaf-mutism did not seriously affect
petitioner's ability to be a painter and that he had adjusted
well to his eondition. 'l'br:re is thus sufficient rvidence in the
record to support its finding.
The award is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, ,J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority concludes that there is some evidence to support the commission's percentage rating of petitioner's disability. I am constrained to disagree. Moreover, the effect
of the majority holding is to defeat the principle that dictates
that there be uniformity in awards for the same injury, which
principle forms the basis of the theory upon >vhich the rating
schedules are based.
The problem in this case is to compute a disability rating
for loss of speech and hearing sustained at age 5 on the basis
of a rating schedule dPsigned for determining the permanent
disability rating of a painter who sustains loss of speech
and hearing at age 40.
No intelligent use of such a sehec1ule is possible until a
common denominator is established between the rating sehedule and the disability to be rated. It is not enough that the
ability or impairment is
permanent disability equal to 70 percent or
more of total, he shall be paid in addition to the compenoation due
under this code for the permanent partial disability caused hy the last
injury,
for the remainder of the combined permanent
disability
after the last injury as provided in this article;
provided, that
the previous disability or impairment affected
a hand, nn nrn1, a
a leg, or an eye, and the perrnanent disability
resulting from the
in,iury affeets the opposite and conesubsequent injury, when considered alone and without •·egard to the
sponding member, or (b) the permanent disability resulting from th"
age of tlle employee, 1> equal to 40 percent or more of total.''
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disability to be rated and the occupation involved are identical
with those appearing in the schedule. The schedule is predicated upon the assumption that the age, injury and claim for
compensation are contemporaneous. In this case the claim
for compensation, and henee the age, occurs at time separate
from the time of
'fhis difference
the use
of the schedule until the significance of the difference is
analyzed to determine whether it
a deviation from
the percentage ascribed to such injury in the
schedule.
This involves an examination of the rating schedule, the
factors considered in preparing the schedule and what it is
designed to compensate.
The law provides that where an employee with a preexisting known permanent disability receives a subsequent
industrial injury which is independent in its effects and does
not aggravate the preexisting permanent disability, but which
results in additional permanent disability, the subsequent
injuries fund is liable for the combined effect of the injuries
if they equal a permanent disability rating of 70 per cent
or more of total disability (Lab. Code, § 4751). Having
created thr need for determining the percentage of permanent
disability to total disability, the law also, by section 4660 of
the Labor Code, prescribes how it is to be computed.
Section 4660, subdivision (b) of the Labor Code authorizes
the preparation of "a schedule for the determination of the
percentage of permanent disabilities in aceordance with this
section." The schedule prepared contains lists of particular
injuries to which all injuries may be related, and a list of
the more frequently found occupations. These two lists are
correlated by means of tables. In addition there are a series
of rating tables to correlate the relative severity of an injury
with the age of the employee at the time of injury. Percentage values are assigned to eaeh injury and through the use
of the tables these percentages are adapted to any given
injury.
In arriving at the value of the percentages for each listed
injury the architects of the schedule take into consideration
the nature of the disability as modified by age and occupation
with consideration given to ability to compete in an open
labor market. (See Lab. Code, § 4660, snbd. [a]; vol. 2,
Appendix to Journal of the Senate, California Regular Session, 1951, p. 58 of Partial Report of Senate Interim Committee to the Senate on ·workmen's Compensation Benefits [hereinafter 1951 Partial Report].) Of course, the percentage of
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permanent disability
from an injury does not depend
entirely on the nature of the disability. Moreover, there
are other factors than those of age and occupation entering
into consideration, sneh as the make-up of the man, his desire
to recover and his inherent adaptability. However, all of
these things affect the individual only and are not eapable of
objective measurement or detet·mination (1951 Partial Heport,
supra, 103). As a result only those factors des<'ribed in section
4660, subdivision (a) of the Labor Code are considered in
ascertaining the percentage of disability to attribute to a
particular injury. The percentage ratings so specified are
considered adequate on the average to eompensate for the
residual physical disability resulting from the injury and to
afford a reasonable period of aecommodation to the effect of
such injury. ( 1951 Partial Hcport, supra, 68.)
This system of disability rating is called the ''standard
measure for determining pen~cntagc of disability to total
disability." ( 1951 Partial Report, supra, 59.) 'rhc reason
justifying such standardization is that it makes it possible
to obtain uniform evaluation for identical disabilities, avoid
unnecessary litigation, and reduce the cost thereof and expedite the promptness of evaluation ( 195] Partial Report,
supra, 69).
It is through the disability rating schedule that the theory
behind the compensation of employees for industrial injuries
is implemented. This theory is termed the theory of rehabilitation. It assumes that a permanently injured employee either can or cannot regain his earning capacity and
if he cannot he must be pensiont'd for life. If he can, he
must be aided financially during the period of rehabilitation.
Where rehabilitation to gainful employment is possible the
amount of compensation is obviously contingent upon whether
the injury will prevent the employee from assuming his former
occupation, and thus, require the development of a new occupational skill, or if he can resume his former job, whether
there is any loss of past proficiency and expcctrd potential
(sec 1951 Partial Report, S1tpra, 102). To illustrate, a bookkeeper who has lost his leg can return to his former work
completely rehabilitated in a short tinw, while the structural
iron worker who loses hi.s leg is forever barred from following
his form<>r occupation. In the latt<>r case, then, the percentage
of disability to total disability would be greater than in the
former case, since the rehabilitation period would be more
extensive. Therefore, in each case the accuracy and proper
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application of the percentages appearing in the disability
schedule must be measured according to the general considerations which prompt the rehabilitation percentage value; that
is, must the employee develop a new skill, and if not, what is
the extent of the loss of past proficiency and expected potential.
If the prineiple of uniformity of compensation for the same
injury is adhered to, it is only differences in the extent of
rehabilitation which can justify a deviation from the percentage assigned an injury in the schedule.
·with the revelation of the factors which permit the assignment of a different percentage from that appearing in the
schedule, it is now possible to compare the percentage value
of the sehedule based on age forty with the injury herei11,
and thus arrive at a pereentage of disability for an employee
now forty, but vvho lost his speech and bearing at age five.
The basis of comparison is the extent of rehabilitation required. The disability is rated first in accordance with the
regularly adopted schedule and then adjusted downward or
upward, or possibly with no change at all depending upon
the differences in rehabilitation (see Springer v. Sttbsequent
Injttries Fund, 21 C.C.C. 335, 342).
The method of accomplishing this comparison is by hearing
evidence, and with all the facts consult the disability schedule,
computing a rating which will be in accord with the rehabilitation principle of the schedule. This is true regardless of
whether the percentage is to be adapted to a case such as the
one now before us
State v. Indnstrial Ace. Corn., 129
Cal.App.2d 302 [276 P.2d 820]) or if the rating is for unscheduled injuries
1951 Partial Report, supra, 58-59).
If it is correct that the sole basis of cmnparison between
the disability schedule and the particular injury involved
herein is the extent of rehabilitation required, then it must
follow that the only relevant evidence on such issue is evidence
that tends to show similarity or dissimilarity between the
rehabilitation required in each instance.
The only evidence presented on this issue came from two
of petitioner's witnesses, both of whom qualified as experts
in the rehabilitation of deaf-mutes for gainful employment.
The wituessrs agreed that loss of speerh and hearing at age
40 would pose no partienlar diffienlty in an employee's ability
to paint. Sneh a disabled rmployee could paint as well after
the injury as he did before. The main problem would be
placement of the worker, and its solution depends on how well
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could communicate to others and understand in
the
some manner another's directions. It was noted that even
assuming
was
the
employee's problem \Vould remain communication. In other words to rehabilitate a deaf-mute
implies that he has some means of
and the better he can communicate the more
the rehabilitation.
·without eoutradiction the
concurred in the opinion
that lip
was the most desirable type of communication.
It constituted the greatest degree of rehabilitation.
established that rehabilitation of a deaf-mute means
learning to communicate, witness Becker testified unequivocally and without dispute that a person who becomes a deafmute at age 5 is not in as good a position for gainful employment and advancement in an occupation as the person who
becomes a deaf-mute at age 40, except in individual cases. The
reason being that a person who becomes a deaf-mute at an
early age never makes the same adjustment as one who becomes a deaf-mute at age 40. A person who could hear before
would have a better chance to go on, whereas the person who
is a deaf-mute at age 5 is still fighting the language barrier.
He cannot express himself in writing or otherwise as well as
one ·who acquires the loss later. 'fhe one who acquires the
disability at age 40 can build speech and lip reading more
quiekly because he has a memory of speech and sound. It is
fair to state that a man who became a deaf-mute at age 40
would get along better, or at least as well as one who incurred
the disability at age 5.
·witness Jonas' testimony was substm1tially in accord with
Becker. However, he did state that a person who became a
deaf-mute at age 40 might have greater disability for a short
time while he is making an adjustment to his mental problem,
but he would not have greater disability in his vocational
problem because he has a greater ability to read and write.
Since the rehabilitation here involved pertains to a return to
gainful employment the mental aspect is not relevant.
The conclusions to be drawn from this testimony are selfevident. It would appear that Gonzales' disability rating can
be no less than that of a man incurring the injury at 40.
The evidence upon which the majority relies to uphold the
panel's finding is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of a
comparison between the rehabilitation problems of a man who
incurs loss of speech and hearing at age 40 and a man age 40
who incurred a similar injury at age 5. 'l'his evidence reads

371
as follows: ". . .
had been a deaf-mute from the
age of five years and was unable to read lips; that he had
learned the painting trade when he was 14; that he had been
a prize fighter and an aircraft worker during the war; and
that in 1944 he joined the painters' union and had worked
steadily from that time until the accident. It further discloses that since his recovery he has worked as
as any
other member of the painters' union." Although it is not
clear, the
utilizes this evidence
to demonstrate that Gonzales is rehabilitated to a greater
degree in comparison to a man who at 40 becomes a deaf-mute.
If I have correctly perceived the use of this evidence then
it is patently clear that the use of it by the majority is incorrect. In fact the evidence is not a comparison at all, but
merely the biographical facts of Gonzales' life. By themselves they are no more significant than anyone else's past
employment history.
The essential element to be established is whether Gonzales
has been vocationally rehabilitated to a greater degree than
an employee who lost his speech and hearing at age 40. The
evidence used by the majority is only probative on this point
if we accept the premise that because a deaf-mute has had
40 years to adjust to his disability he has accomplished greater
rehabilitation than one who at age 40 incurs such a disability.
According to the uncontradicted expert testimony in this case
the premise is false. Quite unfortunately it was first propounded in State v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra. At the
time it was made there was no basis in the record for such
a conclusion. Upon remand of the case to the commission
it appeared that the premise was to be buried after expert
evidence had refuted the truth of it (Springer v. Subsequent Injuries Fund, supra, 338). The expert evidence in
that case was substantially the same as the expert testimony
herein. Thus, the attempt by the majority to resurrect this
premise leads to an untoward and ill-advised result, and it
should be scrapped for the same reason it was in Spr'inger v.
Subseqtwnt Injuries Fund, supra.
If the evidence upon which the majority relies is to have
any relevance at all, it must be to show that Gonzales is an
exceptional individual with better powers of adjustment than
the average person incurring such disability at age 40. Such
proof would then justify a deviation from the disability schedule which is based upon the average individual and be in
keeping with the expert testimony which likewise was phrased
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in terms of the averag-e. However, here again the evidence
is not
to such an infer<'ll('<'. In order to show that
Gonzales is exceptional there must be either a comparison with
an average person, or a demonstration that his past actions
are so remarkable that he may be (•a lied ('Xl:cpt ional. Sine<:: the
re<:ord is deYoid of auy eYidenee of a eomparison, this ground
eannot form the basis f'or a finding that <lonzales was exceptionaL \Y c do know that Gonzales, in addition to being a
, was a prize fighter and ain:rafi. >Yorker. But this evidente, vvithout more, does not tell us that he was exceptional.
He eould have been inept in all fields. In view of the false
premise that vvas unwi8ely announced in State v. Industrial
Ace. Com., supra, we should remain (:iremm;peet in making
ally sueh as8umptions from the history of past employment
without any elaboration in the record to support it.
Portunately we need not rely on Iaek of evidenee to prove
irrelevance, for there is affirmative, uncontradicted evidence
that shovvs Gonzales i8 no more than average. This evidence
is the fact that Gonzales cannot lip reacl. It is true that past
aets do show !-lome measure of adjustment, at present he can
at least hold a position, but the experts all agree that the
failure to lip read will alway8 prevent rehabilitation to the
degree one may attain if the injury is incurred at age 40.
'l'he error of the majority is that it equates the length of
time si.nce the injury with yoeational adjustment. One does
not necessarily follow from the other. It is not time that
promises profieiency, but the dimension of the disability.
Moreover, if the majority opinion is allowed to stand it will
undermine the theory supporting a uniform disability schedule. In the Springer ease, whieh the majority concedes is
factually indistinguishable from the instant ease, an award
against the subsequent injurie8 fund was upheld (21 C.C.C.
335, 337). lf this is correet, then what rational basis can
there be for not allowing an award here~ If the principle of
uniformity in award8 for the same injury is to have any
effieacy the result in the Springer ease should be followed.
Por the foregoing reasons I would annul the decision of the
commission and remand the proceeding.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., coucurrrd.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied ,June
25, 1!)58. Gibson, C. J., Carter, .J., and Traynor, .J., were
of the opiniou that the applieation should be granted.

